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THE APPLICATION OF OUR LAWS TO FOREIGN
MERCHANT SHIPS
BY JOHN M. RAYMOND*
The recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the
cases of McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras' and
Incres S.S. Co. v. International Maritime Workers Union,2 both decided
February 18, 1963, serve to focus attention upon a problem that has been
with us for a long time but which has frequently been dealt with improperly.
The immediate problem which those cases presented was the question whether
the Taft-Hartley Act gave the National Labor Relations Board jurisdiction
over labor matters involving foreign crews of foreign vessels that have come
into our ports. This is but part of the problem of the applicability of our
statutes which are aimed at protecting seamen to situations involving foreign
shipping, and that, in turn, is but one facet of the very much larger problem
of how far we should try to exert our jurisdiction over matters which are also
the concern of, and within the jurisdiction of, another State. This Article
cannot cover the over-all problem beyond indicating some of the fields in
which, and the manner in which, it may arise. Rather it deals only with the
question of the applicability of our laws, specifically, our labor legislation and
acts designed to benefit or to protect seamen, to foreign ships.
It should be borne in mind that the situation being discussed involves
somewhat different considerations from those that might be present in a
case involving a conflict between two states of the Union. Here we are
dealing with a conflict between two equal, independent, sovereign nations,
neither of which is subject to the sovereignty of the other and for whom
there is no common sovereign. The exercise of the sovereignty of the United
States in an area falling within the jurisdiction of another sovereign State
might be challenged by the other as a violation of international law, or at
least as contravening international comity; and our foreign relations might be
affected since there could well be a sharp diplomatic protest against such an
invasion of the sovereign rights of the other State if, indeed, there were not
some measure of retaliation. Furthermore, entirely apart from the effect on
our foreign relations, the imposition of conflicting obligations by two
independent sovereignties almost invariably will work an undesirable hardship
on the party or parties involved.
* Lecturer in International Law, University of Santa Clara School of Law;
A.B., 1916, Princeton University; LL.B., 1921, Harvard Law School; former Deputy
Legal Adviser of the Department of State; member, Massachusetts Bar.
1. - U.S. -, 83 Sup. Ct. 671 (1963).
2. - U.S. -, 83 Sup. Ct. 611 (1963).
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Areas of Conflicting Jurisdiction
There are a number of areas in which such a conflict may arise. Take,
for example, a situation where an individual has dual nationality and therefore
owes allegiance to two independent sovereigns. If such a person works for
the army of the one in time of war-an act perfectly legal under the law of
that State--he may thereby subject himself to charges of treason by the
other.8 Attempted expropriation by one State of property of one of its
nationals that is located in another State which the latter refuses to recognize
is a second situation illustrating such conflicting jurisdictions.4 Still a
different area is encountered when our courts attempt to apply our anti-
trust laws to acts taking place abroad within the jurisdiction of a foreign
State.5 Again there is almost sure to be conflict when one of our courts orders
a party over whom it has personal jurisdiction to perform acts in a State
abroad which are in violation of the laws of that State.8
The most notorious example of this last situation was the order issued
by a federal court some years ago directing Imperial Chemical Industries,
Ltd., a British corporation which was the holder of certain English nylon
patents, to assign the patents to Du Pont from which they had originally
received them.7 Imperial had already entered into a contract in England
with a second British corporation (which was not before the American
court) calling for an exclusive license under the patents to be given to the
second corporation. This contract was legal and enforceable under English law.
The second British corporation therefore sued in England and obtained an
injunction against Imperial prohibiting it from making the patents available
3. See Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717 (1952).
4. See Zwack v. Kraus Bros. & Co., 237 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1956); United States
v. President & Directors of the Manhattan Co., 276 N.Y. 396, 12 N.E.2d 518 (1938).
Compare Moscow Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank of N.Y. & Trust Co., 280 N.Y. 286, 20 N.E.2d
758 (1939), aff'd mem. by equally divided court, 309 U.S. 624 (1940).
5. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 469-70 (2d Cir.
1945) (on certification from Supreme Court for failure of quorum of qualified
justices), motion for a mandamus denied sub nom. United States v. Caffey, 164
F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1947), rev'd sub nom. United States v. District Court, 334 U.S.
258 (1948). See criticism of this case in A.B.A. SEcT. INT'L AND COMp. LAW PRO-
CEEDINGs 33, 43 (1957), and further discussion of the general problem at 51, 119 and
124. See also Haight, International Law and Extraterritorial Application of the Anti.
trust Laws, 63 YALE L.J. 639 (1954) ; Whitney, Sources of Conflict Between Inter..
national Law and the Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE L.J. 655 (1954) ; Note, Extraterri-
torial Application of the Antitrust Laws, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1452 (1956).
6. See In Re Investigation of World Arrangements, 13 F.R.D. 280 (D.D.C.
1952), and In Re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 72 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y.
1947), and the foreign reaction as reported in RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES 124-25 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Compare Holophane
v. United States, 352 U.S. 903 (1956), and editorial comment on this case and an
analogous case in 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 382 (1957). The better technique for dealing with
this problem is illustrated by United States v. Ross, 302 F.2d 831 (2d Cir. 1962),
and United States v. General Elec. Co., 115 F. Supp. 835, 878 (D.N.J. 1954).
7. United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y.
1951), further violation enjoined, 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
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to anyone else and ordering specific performance of the exclusive licensing
agreement.8 Some of the comments of the British court are worth noting as
they forcefully point up the problem and the type of reaction that may be
expected if it is mishandled.
The United States District Court had taken the position that: "It is
not an intrusion on the authority of a foreign sovereign for this court to
direct that steps be taken to remove the harmful effects on the trade of the
United States."" The British court, after pointing out that the contract was
an English contract and that the plaintiff's rights under it were a species of
English property conferring monopoly rights on the owner, stated that the
plaintiff had established "a prima facie case for saying that it is not competent
for the courts of the United States ...to interfere with those rights or to
make orders, the observance of which by our courts would require that
our courts should not exercise the jurisdiction which they have and which
it is their duty to exercise in regard to those rights."'1
At another point the court observed: "Applied conversely, I conceive
that the American courts would likewise be slow (to say the least) to
recognise an assertion on the part of the British courts of jurisdiction
extending, in effect, to the business affairs of persons and corporations in the
United States.""
A final extract from the British opinion follows: "A person who has
an enforceable right to a licence under an English patent appears ...to me
to have, at least, some kind of proprietary interest which it is the duty of our
courts to protect .... [I]t seems to me . . . to be an assertion of an extra-
territorial jurisdiction which we do not recognise for the American courts to
make orders which would destroy or qualify those statutory rights belonging
to an English national who is not subject to the jurisdiction of the American
courts."'12
Repercussions such as this obviously ought to be avoided if possible.
Whenever they are inherently possible our jurisdiction should be exercised
wisely, with full appreciation of the interests of the other State and of the
possible hardship on the parties involved.
Foreign Ships in Our Waters
Let us now look at the area which is more specifically the subject of
this Article. A foreign ship flying a foreign flag enters one of our ports.'3
8. British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., [1952] 2 All
E.R. 780 (C.A.), permanent injunction granted, [1954] 3 All E.R. 88 (Ch.).
9. 105 F. Supp. 215, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
10. [1952] 2 All E.R. at 783.
11. Id. at 782.
12. Id. at 783.
13. Special considerations applying to foreign merchant vessels in passage through
1963]
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To what extent should this country assert its jurisdiction over that ship?
To what extent do- our statutes apply to situations existing and to acts
occurring aboard the vessel? In particular, to what extent do our labor acts
and other statutes which are specifically intended to protect seamen apply to
the crew of the vessel by virtue of its presence in our waters?
For one not familiar with admiralty law or international law, the im-
mediate reaction may well be that if the ship is in our port it is of course sub-
ject to our laws, just as any foreign visitor becomes subject to our laws when
he enters the United States. It is true that the territorial sovereign always
has jurisdiction to apply its laws to acts and situations within its territory,
save in a very few exceptional circumstances. 14 But a ship involves additional
considerations.
Under maritime law of long standing and universal recognition, the
law of the sovereign whose flag the ship flies applies to situations and events
aboard the vessel when it is on the high seas.15 This principle was adopted
because of the necessity of having some law apply on board as the ship
traveled from place to place around the world, for on the high seas there
is no territorial sovereign."6 Indeed, this principle is now a matter of treaty
for us. The Convention on the High Seas which recently entered into force
for the United States 17 expressly states in articles 5 and 6:
Ships have the nationality of the state whose flag they are entitled
to fly .... Ships shall sail under the flag of one state only and, save
in exceptional cases expressly provided for in international treaties
or in these articles, shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the
high seas.' 8
Furthermore, because it is desirable to have a reasonably constant law apply
on board ship to matters internal to the ship, the law of the flag has also been
considered generally as applying to such matters even when the ship enters
foreign territorial waters and ports.' 9 The case of United States v. Flores20
the territorial sea, to foreign public vessels, and to vessels entering our ports in distress
are excluded from the discussion.
14. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S.
(7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812) ; RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 17, 20 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
15. BOCZEK, FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE 157-58 (1962) and authorities cited.
16. See Report of Eighth Session of the International Law Commission, com-
mentary on article 30 of Draft Articles Concerning the Law of the Sea, reproduced in 51
AM. J. INT'L L. 154, 209 (1957).
17. The Convention is not yet officially published by the United States; the text
appears in 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 842 (1958). It entered into force September 30, 1962.
See TREATIES IN FORCE 286 (Dep't State Pub. No. 7481, 1963).
18. 52 Am. J. INT'L L. 842, 843-44 (1958).
19. "Solid grounds of policy have long rendered it inexpedient for States to
assert jurisdiction in matters relating to the internal order and discipline of a foreign
vessel, and affecting solely the ship and its occupants. . . . Jurisdiction has in such
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illustrates the point. An American killed another American on board an
American merchant vessel while it was anchored in a port of the Belgian Congo
250 miles upriver from the coast and thus clearly within Belgian territorial
jurisdiction. The Belgian authorities took no action. The later indictment in
one of our courts was sustained, the court saying:
[A] merchant vessel . . .for purposes of the jurisdiction of the
courts of the sovereignty whose flag it flies to punish crimes com-
mitted upon it, is deemed to be a part of the territory of that
sovereignty, and not to lose that character when in navigable
waters within the territorial limits of another sovereignty.
21
To this principle of jurisdiction of the sovereign of the flag there is an
exception known as the "peace of the port" doctrine which is also of long-
standing recognition. It was clearly enunciated in 1887 in Wildenhus' Case.
22
There a Belgian killed another Belgian on a Belgian vessel while it was in
the port of Jersey City. In sustaining our jurisdiction over the matter, the
United States Supreme Court said:
[W]hen a merchant vessel of one country enters the ports of
another for the purposes of trade, it subjects itself to the law of
the place to which it goes, unless by treaty or otherwise the two
countries have come to some different understanding or agreement
.... [A]l1 matters of discipline and all things done on board
which affected only the vessel or those belonging to her .. .should
be left by the local government to be dealt with by the authorities
of the nation to which the vessel belonged ....
... .But if crimes are committed on board of a character to
disturb the peace and tranquillity of the country to which the vessel
has been brought, the offenders have never by comity or usage
been entitled to any exemption from the operation of the local
laws for their punishment, if the local tribunals see fit to assert
their authority. . . .If the thing done . . . is of a character to
affect those on shore or in the port when it becomes known, the
fact that only those on the ship saw it when it was done, is a matter
of no moment.
2 3
cases generally been yielded to the authorities of the State to which the vessel belongs."
I HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED
STATES 739 (2d ed. 1945). The Department of State has taken the position that "by
comity . . .matters of discipline and all things done on board which affect only the
vessel or those belonging to her and do not involve the peace or dignity of the country
or the tranquillity of the port" should be left to the authorities of the State of registry
of the vessel. 2 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 209 (1940) ; accord,
United States v. Rodgers, 150 U.S. 249, 260 (1893).
20. 289 U.S. 137 (1933).
21. Id. at 155-56.
22. 120 U.S. 1 (1887).
23. Id. at 11-12, 17. The Court distinguished "disputes or quarrels of seamen"
1963]
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These cases clarify the way the conflicting jurisdictions are to be exercised.
Both the State of the flag of the ship and the State in whose waters the
ship may be at the time have jurisdiction; but as to matters internal to the
ship, affecting only the vessel or those belonging to her, by custom and
comity of nations the sovereign of the ship's flag is allowed to exercise its
jurisdiction, subject only to the qualification that if the matter disturbs the
peace and tranquillity of the port or is of a character to affect those on shore
or in the port when it becomes known, then the territorial sovereign may
exercise its jurisdiction. Of course if the latter does not wish to exercise this
right (as was true in the Flores case) then the sovereign of the flag of
the ship may still exercise its jurisdiction.
24
Although these examples are in the field of criminal law, the same
principles apply generally to other reaches of the law. Thus, although the
visiting vessel clearly must obey the local laws relating to matters external
to the ship such as pilotage, safety, health, docking, import and export of
goods, and immigration,25 nevertheless disputes between crew members or
between the crew and the master have quite generally been left to the
jurisdiction of the sovereign of the flag.26 Indeed, many treaties of the
United States with other nations expressly provide that the consul of the
flag State shall have jurisdiction to decide such matters.
27
Two further cases might be mentioned to illustrate the scope of these
principles. In Brown v. Duchesne28 the holder of a United States patent
brought suit for infringement against the master of a vessel which had
entered one of our ports with a gaff aboard employing the patented device.
The ship was French-built, French-owned, and flew the French flag. The
defendant was French. The gaff had been installed in France. The Supreme
Court said:
If it had been manufactured on her deck while she was lying in the
port of Boston, or if the captain had sold it there, he would un-
doubtedly have trespassed upon the rights of the plaintiff, and would
have been justly answerable for the profit and advantage he thereby
obtained ...
and matters relating only to the discipline of the ship, which are to be dealt with by
the authorities of the ship in accordance with the law of the flag, from "crimes which
from their gravity awaken a public interest as soon as they become known." In People
v. Wong Cheng, 46 P.I. 729 (1922), smoking opium on a foreign ship anchored two
and one-half miles from shore in Manila harbor was held properly prosecuted by the
territorial sovereign.
24. 289 U.S. at 159.
25. See 2 HACKWORTH, op. cit. supra note 19, at 261-76.
26. The Albani, 169 Fed. 220 (E.D. Pa. 1909) ; The Ucayali, 164 Fed. 897
(E.D.N.Y. 1908).
27. BOCZEK, op. cit. supra note 15, at 160, 182-84.
28. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183 (1856).
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But, so far as the mere use is concerned ... the only use made
of it which can be supposed to interfere with the rights of the plain-
tiff, was in navigating the vessel into and out of the harbor ....
.... And the court are of opinion that the rights of property
and exclusive use granted to a patentee does [sic] not extend to a
foreign vessel lawfully entering one of our ports .... 29
On the other side is the application of the National Prohibition Act
to foreign vessels entering our waters and ports. In Cunard S.S. Co. v.
Mellon30 certain corporations operating foreign flag ships sought an in-
junction against the application of the act to their vessels. The ships
customarily carried liquor as part of their ship's stores, to be sold or dis-
pensed to passengers and crew for beverage purposes. The act prohibited
"transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into,
or the exportation thereof from, the United States and all territory subject to
the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes .... -1 "Territory" was
said to include territorial waters and ports, and it was held that, since the
Congress had expressly made the prohibition apply in "all territory" of the
United States, all ships entering our waters must comply with our law and
not carry such stores when within such waters.3 2 This resulted in such a flood
of diplomatic protests from a number of nations33 that treaties were entered
into which permitted the ships to bring liquor in as ship's stores provided it
was all placed under seal before the vessel entered United States territorial
waters and remained under seal until after it had left our waters and was
again on the high seas. 4
Cases Involving the Seamen's Acts
The Dingley Act3 5 at one time contained the following provision: "(a) It
shall be unlawful in any case to pay any seaman wages in advance of the
time when he has actually earned the same . . . . [Such payment] shall in
no case . . . absolve the vessel, or the master or owner thereof from full
payment of wages after the same shall have been actually earned ....
(e) This section shall apply as well to foreign vessels as to vessels of the
United States."
Patterson v. Bark Eudora3 6 involved a British vessel in the port of
Portland, Maine, which was signing on seamen there. The court pointed out
29. Id. at 196, 198.
30. 262 U.S. 100 (1923).
31. 40 Stat. 1050 (1917).
32. 262 U.S. at 129.
33. See BIsHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 508 (2d ed.
1962).
34. See 1 HACKWORTH, op. cit. supra note 19, at 674-79.
35. 23 Stat. 55 (1884), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 599(a), (e) (1958).
36. 190 U.S. 169 (1903).
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that this statute was enacted because of the practice of advancing seamen
money that they might dissipate and then, having "thus acquired a partial
control, and by liquor dulled their faculties, [placing] . . .them on board the
vessel just ready to sail. '" 7 The Court said: "The implied consent of this
government to leave jurisdiction over the internal affairs of foreign merchant
vessels in our harbors to the nations to which those vessels belong may be
withdrawn. . . . [T]his legislation, as plainly as words can make it, imposes
these conditions upon the shipment of sailors in our harbors, and declares
that they are applicable to foreign vessels as well as to domestic vessels.
38
The act was held applicable to the British vessel.
Next came Sandberg v. McDonald,3 9 wherein a foreign vessel had
advanced wages in Liverpool and the advances were deducted from payments
to the seamen made in the United States. In discussing whether the act
should be construed as applying, the Court said: "Conceding . . . that
Congress might have legislated to annul such contracts [granting advance
payments] as a condition upon which foreign vessels might enter the ports
of the United States, it is to be noted, that such sweeping and important
requirement is not found specifically made in the statute. Had Congress
intended to make void such contracts and payments a few words would have
stated that intention, not leaving such an important regulation to be gathered
from implication. '40 In this situation the act was held inapplicable. Thus,
although Congress by its explicit language overrode the implied exemption
from the exercise of its jurisdiction which ordinarily derives from the
doctrine of the "internal economy of the ship," it did not use language which
made compliance abroad a condition of entry of the ship into our waters.
Thereafter Congress amended the statute by adding the following
language: "The payment of such advance wages ...whether made within
or without the United States . .. shall in no case . . . absolve the vessel
or the master . . .from the full payment of wages after the same shall have
been actually earned." 4' Although Congress apparently thought it was curing
the difficulty, when the Court considered this language in Jackson v. Archi-
medes42 it said: "That this amendment expressed no intention to extend the
provision of the statute to advance payments made by foreign vessels while in
foreign ports, is plain .... The amendment . . .made no reference whatever
to foreign vessels; left unchanged and in full force all of paragraph (e) which
.. . as held in the Sandberg case, indicated that the prohibition . . .was
37. Id. at 175.
38. Id. at 178.
39. 248 U.S. 185 (1918).
40. Id. at 195.
41. 41 Stat. 1006 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 599(a) (1958).
42. 275 U.S. 463 (1928).
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intended to apply to foreign vessels only while in waters of the United
States."
43
Once again there was a movement to amend the act further to cover
the point; but there was "a storm of diplomatic protest," and the bill was
killed. 44 There is clearly a limit of tolerance beyond which other nations
will rise up in protest and possible retaliation when we try to extend our
laws to situations deemed by them to be more properly within their juris-
diction, as illustrated by the aftermath of the Cunard case discussed above and
the instant effort to extend the coverage of the Dingley Act.
Another section of the Seamen's Acts, as amended in 1915, provided:
"Every seaman . . . shall be entitled to receive . . . one-half part of the
wages which he shall have then earned at every port where such vessel
... shall load or deliver cargo .... [A]l1 stipulations in the contract to the
contrary shall be void. . . . [T]his section shall apply to seamen on foreign
vessels while in harbors of the United States, and the courts of the United
States shall be open to such seamen for its enforcement. '4 5 In Strathearn
S.S. Co. v. Dillon46 the Court held this applied to a British seaman on a
British ship in the Port of Pensacola even though the contract of employment,
legal under English law, provided that there should be no advances other
than at the pleasure of the master. The Court pointed to the express language
rendering void the contract provision and extending the coverage to seamen
on foreign vessels in our harbors; the provision opening our courts to such
seamen was said to make it clear that foreign seamen on foreign vessels
were to have the benefit of the act, since American seamen could always use
our courts.
Before leaving this line of cases it should be noted that, on the authority of
the Strathearn case, a separate but related section of the law, which required
the payment of full wages earned within a certain length of time after the
voyage was completed or after the employment terminated,4 7 was likewise
held applicable to foreign seamen on foreign vessels in our ports, since
the two sections derived from the same original section and should be con-
strued together.
4
An analysis of the cases under the Jones Act and the Taft-Hartley and
Norris-LaGuardia Acts is necessarily dependent upon the principles gleaned
from the decisions discussed above. Even an understanding of these funda-
43. Id. at 470.
44. See Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138, 146 (1957).
45. 38 Stat. 1164 (1915), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 597 (1958).
46. 252 U.S. 348 (1920).
47. REV. STAT. § 4529 (1898), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 596 (1958).
48. The Fletero v. Arias, 206 F.2d 267 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 897
(1953); The Sonderborg, 40 F.2d 652 (E.D. Va. 1930), aff'd, 47 F.2d 723 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 284 U.S. 618 (1931).
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mentals will not enable one to understand many of the holdings in this area
because it is nearly impossible to find order where the approach to solution
of the same problem in various cases has been confusing if not chaotic.49
The Jones Act Cases
The pertinent language of the Jones Act reads as follows: "Any seaman
who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his
election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of trial by
jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States modifying or ex-
tending the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to rail-
way employees shall apply."50 The last clause refers to the Federal Employers'
Liability Act,51 under which the defenses of assumption of risk, contributory
negligence, and negligence of a fellow servant have been eliminated.
It should be appreciated that a maritime tort, which is what is involved
when a seaman suffers actionable personal injury in the course of his employ-
ment, would, apart from such a statute, be tried in admiralty without a
jury.52 The defenses just enumerated would be available. Certain other dis-
tinctions would obtain, but for present purposes it is enough to note that the
procedure and, indeed, the scope of the action provided by the Jones Act are
rather radically different from the traditional admiralty proceeding.
What was the legal effect of this law on the doctrines we have been
examining? This question was early answered by the Supreme Court in
Panama R.R. v. Johnson,53 where the Court said:
Rightly understood, the statute neither withdraws injuries
to seamen from the reach and operation of the maritime law, nor
enables a seaman to do so. On the contrary, it brings into that law
new rules drawn from another system and extends to injured seamen
a right to invoke, at their election, either the relief accorded by the
old rules or that provided by the new rules. The election is between
alternatives accorded by the maritime law as modified, and not
between that law and some non-maritime system.H
49. In Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 263 F.2d 437, 439 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1000 (1959), Judge Medina stated, with respect to decisions
involving the Jones Act, that there had been "a lack of any common principle of
decision or method of approach to the problem. Sometimes the courts seem to be
employing choice of law techniques, and not infrequently the result arrived at seems to
be based on mere dialectic manipulation or guesswork." Until the recent decision of
the Supreme Court in McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras,
supra note 1, there was also much misunderstanding as to the scope of application of
the Taft-Hartley Act. See text accompanying notes 91, 96 and 108 infra.
50. 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1958).
51. See Federal Employers' Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45
U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1958).
52. 1 BENEDICT, AMERICAN ADMIRALTY § 127 (6th ed. 1940); 2 BENEDICT, op. cit.
supra § 224.
53. 264 U.S. 375 (1924).
54. Id. at 388, 389.
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Even though the Jones Act imported into maritime law the procedure of an
action at law and the limitation of defenses as prescribed by the FELA, the
case is still one under maritime law; and considerations of general significance
in maritime law still have a bearing. To be more specific, the "law of the
flag" and "internal economy of the ship" doctrines still have application.
It may be assumed that the act, at the least, would offer its benefits to
American seamen on American flag vessels owned and controlled by American
citizens, even though the injury did not occur within the territorial jurisdiction
of the United States.55 But would it be applied in the converse case where the
ship was of foreign flag and foreign control and ownership even though the
injury occurred in a United States port? The act contains no specific language
importing applicability to foreign ships in our ports, as did the Dingley Act.
In view of the reliance of the courts on the specific language in the latter act
which made it applicable to foreign vessels in ports of the United States it
might well have resulted that the Jones Act would not have been applied to
any foreign ship.
But that line was not drawn. Uravic v. Jarka56 involved an American
stevedore5 7 who was killed while unloading a German ship in New York
harbor. The Court applied the Jones Act since the deceased was an American
citizen and the accident occurred in a port of the United States. Mr. Justice
Holmes, speaking for the Court, reasoned that:
The rights of a citizen within the territorial limits of the country
are more extensively determined by the scope of actions for torts
than even by the law of crimes. There is strong reason for giving
the same protection to the person of those who work in our harbors
when they are working upon a German ship that they would receive
when they are working upon an American ship in the next dock
.... We see no reason for limiting the liability for torts com-
mitted there when they go beyond the scope of discipline and
private matters that do not interest the territorial power.' 8
The situation was quite properly viewed as concerning something more than
mere internal economy of the ship. In the language of Wildenhus' Case, this
could be said to be "of a character to affect those on shore or in the port
when it becomes known." The State of the flag could not reasonably object
55. Panama R.R. v. Johnson, supra note 53; Wenzler v. Robin Line S.S. Co.,
277 Fed. 812 (W.D. Wash. 1921).
56. 282 U.S. 234 (1931).
57. Longshoremen and stevedores have been held to be encompassed within the
meaning of "seamen" in the Jones Act. International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272
U.S. 50 (1926).
58. 282 U.S. at 238, 240.
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to an application of American law to a case concerning injury of an American
seaman "momentarily on board a private German ship in New York." 59
This application of the act was carried a slight step further in Gambera
v. Bergoty,60 a case before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in 1942. In
that case the injured seaman was not even a citizen. However, he had main-
tained a domicile here for over twenty years, and most of that time had
served on United States ships on voyages beginning and ending here. It was
on a trip from Trenton to Philadelphia aboard a foreign ship that he was
injured. The entire voyage was within our territorial waters. The court
invoked the Jones Act, stressing these facts and apparently for this purpose
equating long domicile and citizenship.
Although the Supreme Court has not yet passed squarely upon the
point, the lower courts have taken the position that the act was not only
intended to be available to American seamen for injuries suffered here or on
American flag ships abroad but, indeed, was to be available for injuries
suffered abroad on a ship of foreign registry if the operator of the ship was
an American. In other words, the act was not only to give the American
seaman an alternative form of action but it was intended to subject American
ship operators to the burden of facing such alternative proceedings even
though the injury occurred abroad and on a foreign flag ship. Thus, in
Gerradin v. United Fruit Co.,61 an American seaman injured on the high
seas aboard a vessel of Honduran registry and flag but owned and operated
by Americans was allowed to invoke the Jones Act. There is no question of
violation of international law in such a situation, since nationality gives a
State jurisdiction to impose liabilities on the individual.6 2 The only question
is whether the Jones Act should be interpreted as applying in such a case.
The Supreme Court has spoken in two significant cases. The first was
Lauritzen v. Larsen, 3 in which case a Danish seaman, while temporarily in
New York, joined the crew of a Danish-owned ship of Danish registry and
flag. The articles of employment provided that the seaman's rights were to
be governed by Danish law. The injury was sustained in Havana harbor.
Although this was an extreme case which could have been disposed of in
short order, the Court took pains to expand the principles which should
govern the decision whether the Jones Act should be invoked. In denying its
application the Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Jackson, made the
following observations:
59. Id. at 240.
60. 132 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 742 (1943).
61. 60 F.2d 927 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 642 (1932).
62. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 102 (1922); RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 20, 30 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
63. 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
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If [the Jones Act be] read literally, Congress has conferred an
American right of action which requires nothing more than the
plaintiff be "any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the
course of his employment." . . .
... . While some [maritime statutes] have been specific in
application to foreign shipping and others in being confined to
American shipping, many give no evidence that Congress addressed
itself to their foreign application, [leaving it] . . . to be judicially
determined from context and circumstance. By usage as old as the
Nation, such statutes have been construed to apply only to areas
and transactions in which American law would be considered
operative under prevalent doctrines of international law ...
... [Ilt has long been accepted in maritime jurisprudence
that ". . . if any construction otherwise be possible, an Act will not
be construed as applying to foreigners in respect to acts done by
them outside the dominions of the sovereign power enacting.
That is a rule based on international law by which one sovereign
power is bound to respect the subjects and the rights of all other
sovereign powers outside its own territory." Lord Russell of
Killowen in The Queen v. Jameson, (1896) 2 Q.B. 425, 430 ...
[W]e are simply dealing with a problem of statutory construction
64
Having thus established the approach to be taken, the Court noted that
since the legislature did not address itself specifically to the application of
the statute to out-of-state occurrences, such application must be determined in
accordance with ordinary conflict-of-law rules, and in accordance with the
doctrines and practices of maritime law. Frequent and regular contacts with
United States ports were not considered a sufficient basis for application of
United States statutes since "the virtue and utility of sea-borne commerce lies
in its frequent and important contacts with more than one country. ...
[Courts] have generally deferred to a nonnational or international maritime
law of impressive maturity and universality.
'65
The opinion noted that maritime law resolves "conflicts between com-
peting laws by ascertaining and valuing points of contact between the
transaction and the states or governments whose competing laws are in-
volved. . . . [I]n dealing with international commerce we cannot be
unmindful of the necessity for mutual forbearance if retaliations are to be
avoided; nor should we forget that any contact which we hold sufficient to
warrant application of our law to a foreign transaction will logically be as
strong a warrant for a foreign country to apply its law to an American
transaction.
66
64. Id. at 576-78.
65. Id. at 581.
66. Id. at 582.
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Mr. Justice Jackson then proceeded to enumerate seven points of
contact to be considered.
1. Place of the wrongful act. "[T]he territorial standard is so unfitted
to an enterprise conducted under many territorial rules and under
none that it usually is modified by the more constant law of the
flag."
67
2. Law of the flag. "Perhaps the most venerable and universal rule of
maritime law relevant to our problem is that which gives cardinal
importance to the law of the flag .... It is significant to us here that
the weight given to the ensign overbears most other connecting events
in determining applicable law."
'68
3. Allegiance or domicile of the injured. "In some later American cases,
courts have been prompted to apply the Jones Act by the fact that
the wrongful act or omission alleged caused injury to an American
citizen or domiciliary." But the Court noted that the question was
not involved in the instant case as the two coincided. 69
4. Allegiance of the defendant shipowner. The Court commented that
although some American cases have occasionally looked through
more or less nominal foreign registration of the ship to enforce the
Jones Act against an American owner, the propriety of this applica-
tion was not involved here.
70
5. Place of contract. While this would be of significance in a contract
action, it is not "a substantial influence in the choice between com-
peting laws to govern a maritime tort."
'71
6. Inaccessibility of foreign forum. This might be persuasive if juris-
diction were discretionary, but it is "not persuasive as to the law
by which it shall be judged.
'7 2
7. Law of the forum. "Jurisdiction of maritime cases in all countries
is so wide and the nature of its subject matter so far-flung that there
would be no justification for altering the law of a controversy just
because local jurisdiction of the parties is obtainable."
73
Thus, the place of the wrongful act, the place of contract, inaccessibility
of the foreign forum and the law of the forum were held to be insignificant if
not irrelevant considerations in a situation of this sort. The law of the flag
"overbears most other connecting events." The significance of the allegiance of
67. Id. at 584.
68. Id. at 584-85.
69. Id. at 586.
70. Id. at 587.
71. Id. at 588.
72. Id. at 589-90.
73. Id. at 590.
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the injured and of the shipowner did not have to be decided, and these are
dismissed with some suggestion that the points are of recent innovation by
lower courts. It was made clear that they were not being passed upon by the
Supreme Court.
Finally came Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co.7 4 A
Spaniard was employed under a contract entered into in Spain on a ship
of Spanish flag and registry, owned by a Spanish corporation, for a voyage
beginning and ending in Spain. He was injured while in United States
territorial waters, and he invoked the Jones Act. In the opinion, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter made the following observations:
The broad principles of choice of law and the applicable criteria
of selection set forth in Lauritzen were intended to guide courts
in the application of maritime law generally. . . . [T]he similarity
in purpose and function of the Jones Act and the general maritime
law principles of compensation for personal injury, admit of no
rational differentiation of treatment for choice of law purposes....
... . The controlling considerations are the interacting inter-
ests of the United States and of foreign countries, and in assessing
them we must move with the circumspection appropriate when this
Court is adjudicating issues inevitably entangled in the conduct of
our international relations ...
[Regarding the fact that the injury occurred in United States
waters, the rule of the place of the injury, although often deter-
minative of choice of law in municipal conflict of laws], does not
fit the accommodations that become relevant in fair and prudent re-
gard for the interests of foreign nations in the regulation of their
own ships and their own nationals, and the effect upon our interests
of our treatment of the legitimate interests of foreign nations. To
impose on ships the duty of shifting from one standard of compensa-
tion to another as the vessel passes the boundaries of territorial water
would be not only an onerous but also an unduly speculative burden,
disruptive of international commerce and without basis in the
expressed policies of this country.
75
This decision would seem clearly to overrule certain prior cases, such
as Kyriakos v. Goulandris,70 and, coupled with the remarks in Lauritzen,
would seem to shed grave doubt upon the propriety of the later decision of
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Southern Cross S.S. Co. v. Firipis.77
In Kyriakos an alien had come to the United States as a seaman, and had
been here only three months when he signed on a foreign ship for a voyage
on which he was injured in an American port. Three months temporary
74. 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
75. Id. at 382-84.
76. 151 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1945).
77. 285 F.2d 651 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 869 (1961).
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residence here can hardly be equated to domicile of twenty years, even
assuming that use of the criterion of American nationality of the injured is
appropriate and the long American domicile of an alien meets the test of
American nationality; nevertheless, recovery under the Jones Act was per-
mitted. The Romero decision seems clearly to be contrary to Kyriakos.
The Firipis case involved a Greek seaman who signed his employment
contract in Greece. He was injured on a vessel of Honduran registry and
flag which was in drydock in the United States. His contract said that in
case of accident Honduran law applied. The ship was owned by a Liberian
corporation, eighty per cent of whose stock was owned by Greeks and
twenty per cent by Americans. The control of the ship was found to be partly
in the Greek owners and partly in the American owners, but there was no
finding concerning who was responsible for the negligence involved in the
case. In applying the Jones Act the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals relied
heavily upon minority American indirect ownership and partial control as a
sufficient basis for such application. To apply the statute to a ship of foreign
registry, whose direct ownership and majority indirect ownership and control
was foreign, in a case where the injured party was foreign, would seem to be
contrary to the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in Lauritzen and
Romero. The so-called "flag of convenience" problem that was thought to be
present is hardly an excuse for disregard of those principles. 78
78. The Firipis case is an extreme example of the tendency of some courts and
of the National Labor Relations Board to disregard the flag and registry of the ship
when it is believed to be a "flag of convenience." In this connection it should be
noted that now, by treaty, we are committed to the proposition that "ships have the
nationality of the state whose flag they are entitled to fly." See authority cited and
text accompanying note 17 supra. The costs of operating a ship under American
registry have become prohibitive for many in the competitive world market. The
high crew standards required for such registry impose a great financial burden. Tax
and other considerations contribute to the urge to use another flag. Because Honduras,
Liberia and Panama offer the most favorable conditions they have largely been
utilized as States where shipping thus driven from the American flag could be registered.
Their flags have therefore become known as "flags of convenience," although the
shipping industry calls them "flags of necessity." Furthermore, it is understood that
the United States Navy is interested in utilization of the flags of these countries in
preference to other foreign flags by merchant shipping, as there are said to be informal
arrangements with those countries for quick transfer of the ships to American registry
in case of war, thus augmenting the merchant fleet reserve. This Article deliberately
avoids discussion of flags of convenience save where reference to them becomes
essential. For an excellent and full exposition and discussion of the flag-of-convenience
problem see BOCZEK, FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE (1962); see also Note, The Effect of
United States Labor Legislation on the Flag-of-Convenience Fleet: Regulation of
Shipboard Labor Regulations and Remedies Against Shoreside Picketing, 69 YALE
L.J. 498 (1960) ; Note, Panlibhon Registration of American-Owned Merchant Ships:
Government Policy and the Problem of the Courts, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 711 (1960);
Harolds, Some Legal Problems Arising Out of Foreign Flag Operations, 28 FORDHAM
L. REV. 295 (1959). On Jones Act cases generally see annot., 84 A.L.R.2d 906
(1962) ; Morrison, The Foreign Seaman and the Jones Act, 8 MIAMI L.Q. 16 (1953).
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There were, however, other cases involving foreign seamen not domiciled
here in which the Jones Act was held properly invoked with far more reason
than can be found in Kyriakos or Firipis. They are based on an extension of
what seems to have been the underlying premise of the Gerradin case discussed
above, namely, that the Jones Act subjected to its procedure any American
who owned and operated a ship, even where technically the ship was under a
foreign flag. Thus, Carroll v. United States79 involved an Irish seaman who
was injured on the high seas on a vessel owned by the United States Govern-
ment and operated by a New York corporation. The ship was of Panamanian
registry, yet the Jones Act was held properly invoked as against the operator.
This is a clear holding that the act not only protects American seamen on
American flag vessels or in an American port but also subjects American ship
operators to the burden of having it invoked against them, regardless of the flag
of the vessel, the place of the injury or the nationality of the injured.
A slight variation of this situation, but in principle the same, was the
case of Zielinski v. Empresa Hondurena de Vapores8° in which the vessel
was foreign owned but the ultimate ownership of stock and the control of
the vessel were one hundred per cent American. Furthermore, the seaman
was domiciled here and had taken out first papers. In applying the Jones Act,
the federal court for the Southern District of New York relied heavily on the
element of American control of the vessel. That this element rather than
the domicile of the injured party was the decisive factor is shown by
Rodriguez v. Solar Shipping, Ltd.,81 where the facts were similar save for the
lack of such domicile, yet the same court again applied the Jones Act. Where,
however, the seaman was alien, the ship was of foreign registry, the accident
occurred outside the waters of the United States, and the ship was operated
by aliens, the fact that the vessel was owned by a foreign corporation which
in turn was owned by Americans was held in several cases not to be
sufficient.8 2 The control element was said to be lacking and essential.
O'Neill v. Cunard White Star83 was an attempt at extreme application
of the act. The only contact with the United States was the twenty-year domi-
cile here of the injured seaman, coupled with the fact that he had applied for
citizenship. He had signed articles in England for a voyage to Canada and
return on a British vessel which was British owned and operated. He was
washed overboard on the high seas because of alleged negligence of the
79. 133 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1943).
80. 113 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
81. 169 F. Supp. 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
82. Moutzouris v. National Shipping & Trading Co., 194 F. Supp. 468 (S.D.N.Y.
1961); Mprourneriotis v. Seacrest Shipping Co., 149 F. Supp. 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y.
1957) ; Argyros v. Polar Compania de Navegacion, Ltda., 146 F. Supp. 624 (S.D.N.Y.
1956).
83. 160 F.2d 446 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 773 (1947).
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owner. The opinion by Judge Learned Hand contains interesting language:
"As a tort the liability could be determined by the law of the flag, that being
the pattern upon which rights and duties are declared for acts done upon the
high seas." This statement would tend to discredit the cases mentioned above
where recovery under the Jones Act was permitted against an American
operator of a foreign flag ship. Judge Hand then pointed out that in the
cases where the accident occurred in American waters the question was
whether the statute, which literally applied, should yield to the "internal
economy" doctrine; but here the question was whether the law of the flag
should give way to the statute when the accident occurred in a place where
the statute did not expressly apply. "Perhaps Congress might go even so far
as that, granted an occasion pressing enough; but surely there should be
the clearest warrant of its purpose to do so, for it is as extreme an exercise
of power as one can well imagine." 84
In the light of Mr. Justice Jackson's remarks in Lauritzen, the reaffirma-
tion of those principles by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Romero, and the
rationale of Judge Hand in O'Neill, it is submitted that the cardinal
principle, supported by long tradition and by numerous cases dealing with
other statutes and other situations, is that the law of the flag should govern
unless there are powerful overriding reasons to the contrary. The Jones Act
should be invoked where the vessel is of American registry, but not other-
wise unless the accident occurred within United States waters and the
injured party is an American citizen or domiciliary. However, in view of
the several decisions of the lower courts that have permitted the use of the
act where the control (as distinguished from ownership) of the vessel was
in American hands even though the flag was foreign, the application of the
statute to such cases should be assumed, subject to the possibility of later
qualification by the Supreme Court.
Cases Under the Taft-Hartley and Norris-LaGuardia Acts
There remain for consideration the problems growing out of the Taft-
Hartley and Norris-LaGuardia Acts. To what extent do these apply to foreign
ships that may enter our ports? The issues so far raised in the courts fall
into two broad categories: the applicability of these acts to strikes which have
tied up foreign shipping at our docks, and the assumption by the National
Labor Relations Board of jurisdiction to order representation elections
among the crew. Fortunately, the Supreme Court has dealt with both
problems, so little attention need be given to the decisions of the lower
courts or of the National Labor Relations Board save to provide a back-
ground.
84. Id. at 448.
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The first case to come before the Supreme Court was Benz v. Compania
Naviera Hidalgo.s" A Liberian flag ship, which was owned by a Panamanian
corporation and whose seamen were entirely alien, was in the harbor of
Portland, Oregon. While there the crew struck for increased wages and better
conditions of employment. An American union was designated as their
bargaining agent, and it started picketing the ship. On application to a
federal district court an injunction issued which stopped the picketing, and
the ship was enabled to sail. The case was continued for determination of
damages. The contention of the defendant union was that there was no
jurisdiction because the Taft-Hartley Act 6 gave exclusive jurisdiction to the
National Labor Relations Board. The Court pointed out that the question
was "one of intent of the Congress as to the coverage of the Act. ' '87 After
reviewing the history of the Dingley Act and the cases under it, the Court
examined the language of the Taft-Hartley Act and its legislative history
and found the congressional intent was to have the coverage of the act apply
only to "the workingmen of our own country."88 Then came language fre-
quently cited since: "For us to run interference in such a delicate field of
international relations there must be present the affirmative intention of the
Congress clearly expressed. It alone has the facilities necessary to make
fairly such an important policy decision where the possibilities of international
discord are so evident and retaliative action so certain."8 9 It was held that
there was no express congressional intention to have the act apply to foreign
vessels with foreign crews, but rather the intent was, as stated by Chairman
Hartley, one of the authors of the act, that it should be "a bill of rights both
for American workingmen and for their employers." 90
Considerable doubt was shed upon the scope of the Benz decision-
indeed, some felt it had been partially if not wholly overruled 9l-by the
decision of the Court in the case of Marine Cooks & Stewards, AFL v.
Panama S.S. Co. 92 Superficially, the two cases seem to involve the same
type of situation, for this second case also involved a foreign ship, operated
85. Supra note 44.
86. 61 Stat. 143, 146 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 159, 160 (1958).
87. 353 U.S. at 142.
88. Id. at 144.
89. Id. at 147. In Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 286 (1949), holding that
the Eight Hour Law did not apply to work on our military bases in Iran and Iraq,
the Court said: "An intention so to regulate labor conditions which are the primary
concern of a foreign country should not be attributed to Congress in the absence of a
clearly expressed purpose."
90. 353 U.S. at 144.
91. See, e.g., Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras v. McCulloch, 201
F. Supp. 82 (D.D.C. 1962), where the court refuted the idea that Benz had been thus
overruled, as had apparently been argued by counsel.
92. 362 U.S. 365 (1960).
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by a foreign crew, which was picketed by an American union while the vessel
was in one of our ports. But there was a significant difference-the statute
here involved was the Norris-LaGuardia Act, not the Taft-Hartley Act;
and the question related to enjoining the picketing, not to assessing damages
for illegal picketing. The precise issue was whether the Norris-LaGuardia
Act prohibited the district court from issuing an injunction to stop the
picketing. In Benz that issue was not before the Supreme Court. As to this
point the Court noted that the act provided that "no court of the United States
. . . shall have jurisdiction to issue any ... injunction in a case involving or
growing out of a labor dispute," 93 with exceptions not pertinent; and that
the controversy here was one "concerning terms or conditions of employment,"
and hence was a labor dispute within the meaning of the act. In view of the
mandatory language there was no room for an exception even where there
was a finding, as made by the lower court, that the conduct might "interfere
in the internal economy of a vessel registered under the flag of a friendly
foreign power." In short, the Court said that the Congress, by express
language used in the act, had overridden the customary rule of comity, as
had been done by the National Prohibition Act involved in the Cunard case.
94
Furthermore, the American union took the position that it was picketing
because foreign competition by vessels with substandard conditions of em-
ployment, including the ship being picketed, was depriving American seamen
(which their union represented) of employment which would otherwise be
theirs. The Court in a footnote pointed out that "the union members here
were not interested in the internal economy of the ship, but rather were inter-
ested in preserving job opportunities for themselves in this country. They
were picketing on their own behalf, not on behalf of the foreign employees as
in Benz."9
The Court distinguished Benz further by saying that it had held that
the Taft-Hartley Act did not apply to wage disputes arising on a foreign
vessel between nationals of other countries, but that the Court did not decide
in that case whether picketing of such a ship could be enjoined. However,
as already noted, there persisted some confusion following the Marine Cooks
decision, and the National Labor Relations Board, which had already
started to assert jurisdiction over certain foreign flag ships in labor matters,
saw no reason to change its course.96 It is true that the cases where the
Board asserted its jurisdiction concerned flag-of-convenience ships, and
while the Board did not state that it was disregarding the flag and treat-
93. 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101, 104 (1958).
94. See authority cited and text accompanying note 30 supra.
95. 362 U.S. at 371 n.12.
96. See BOCZEK, op. cit. supra note 78, at 174-77.
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ing them as American ships, it is clear from its opinions that it gave much
weight to the fact of beneficial ownership being American. But, as suggested
in the discussion of the Jones Act cases, this factor is not one that should
be given consideration in determining how far our jurisdiction should be
asserted over ships flying a foreign flag.
97
The leading decision of the Board was in the case of West India Fruit
& S.S. Co.98 The vessel involved was under Liberian registry and flag,
with ultimate stock ownership being American. The crew and officers were
Cuban. The ship plied between New Orleans and Havana. The case involved
an unfair labor practice charge brought by an American union which
attempted to organize the crew. In deciding the question whether the act
gave it jurisdiction which should be asserted, the Board strangely looked to
Lauritzen v. Larsen for guidance rather than following the holding of Benz.
It noted that Lauritzen detailed a number of possible points of contact, and
analogized by saying that here there was continuing American commerce and
an American employer, and these constituted sufficient "points of contact"
for it to assert jurisdiction. It disposed of the law of the flag doctrine by
saying that if that were to apply the discussion in Lauritzen was completely
unnecessary; and it disposed of the internal economy of the ship doctrine by
saying that was merely part of the law of the flag principle and therefore had
already been disposed of. In any event, said the Board, the matter was not
entirely internal to the ship as the Congress had found that labor disputes
"have the intent or necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce," 99
a matter obviously external to the ship.
Other cases followed with like decisions by the Board, until there arose a
case involving the fleet of the United Fruit Company.100 The vessels were
of Honduran registry and owned by a Honduran corporation, which in turn
was owned by United Fruit. United Fruit determined ports of call, sailings
and cargoes of its fleet. The crews were foreign and were members of a
Honduran union, which was recognized by Honduras as the bargaining agent
for these crews. Under Honduran law only a union recognized by Honduras
and having at least ninety per cent Honduran citizens can represent seamen
on Honduran vessels, and the Honduran union here met these requirements.
Honduran law also compels the shipowner to deal exclusively with the
union which Honduras recognizes as the bargaining agent. But the National
Labor Relations Board was requested by an American union to hold a
representation election, although the American union could not have qualified
97. See authorities cited and text accompanying notes 78 and 82 su pra.
98. 130 N.L.R.B. 343 (1961).
99. Id. at 356.




under the Honduran law to act for these crews. The Board took the position
that the United Fruit Company was a joint employer, and as the ships
habitually moved between the United States and Latin America there were
substantial contacts with the United States which outweighed the foreign
contacts. When it ordered representation elections to be held, the Honduran
union in one case and the Honduran shipowner in another sued to enjoin
the Board from holding them. 10 '
Both cases reached the Supreme Court of the United States, and were
decided on February 18, 1963, under the title McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional
de Marinheros de Honduras.10 2 As might have been expected, the Court
expressly followed its opinion in the Benz case, where it had held that the
legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act "inescapably describes the
boundaries of the Act as including only the workingmen of our own country
and its possessions."'01 3 It pointed out that the Marine Cooks decision was
specifically limited to the jurisdiction of the court to issue the injunction
which it did under the circumstances shown, and in no way limited the
scope or effect of Benz. As to the Board's "balancing-of-contacts" theory,
the Court said:
[T]o follow such a suggested procedure to the ultimate might re-
quire that the Board inquire into the internal discipline and order of
all foreign vessels calling at American ports. Such activity would
raise considerable disturbance not only in the field of maritime law
but in our international relations as well. In addition enforcement of
Board orders would project the courts into application of the sanc-
tions of the Act to foreign flag ships on a purely ad hoc weighing of
contacts basis. This would inevitably lead to embarrassment in foreign
affairs and be entirely infeasible in actual practice.
10 4
After discussing the internal economy doctrine the Court pointed out that if
the Board's order were carried out there would be a "head-on collision"
between the American union and the Honduran Union; and that even if the
Honduran union should withdraw (which seemed unthinkable) the American
union would be prohibited under Honduran law from representing the crew.
"Questions of such international import would remain as to invite retaliatory
action from other nations as well as Honduras." 0 5
101. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras v. McCulloch, supra note 91;
Empresa Hondurena de Vapores v. McLeod, 200 F. Supp. 484 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
102. - U.S. -, 83 Sup. Ct. 671 (1963).
103. Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138, 144 (1957).
104. - U.S. at -, 83 Sup. Ct. at 676.
105. The United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Honduras filed briefs
as amici curiae in the Supreme Court opposing the jurisdiction of the Board; and in
the companion Incres case (infra note 107) the United States, the United Kingdom,
Liberia and Panama filed briefs to the same effect.
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In a footnote the Court stated that, while the weighing of contacts
method of decision was not applicable here, "Our conclusion does not fore-
close such a procedure in different contexts, such as the Jones Act . . .
where the pervasive regulation of the internal order of a ship may not be
present." But the Court continued with this caveat: "As regards applica-
tion of the Jones Act to maritime torts on foreign ships, however, the
Court has stated that 'perhaps the most venerable and universal rule of
maritime law relevant to our problem is that which gives cardinal importance
to the law of the flag.' "106
On the same day McCulloch was decided the Supreme Court handed
down a decision in the companion case of Incres S.S. Co. v. International
Maritime Workers Union,0 7 which showed that McCulloch was not to be
narrowly construed. A New York State court had decided it could not
enjoin picketing of a foreign ship which had an alien crew because the
National Labor Relations Board "arguably" had exclusive jurisdiction
under the Taft-Hartley Act. 10 8 The Supreme Court noted that, while such
was the state of the law at the time of the New York court's decision, the
McCulloch decision had changed the picture. The Court said that it made no
difference that the Board's apparent jurisdiction here would be to prevent
unfair labor practices rather than to hold a representation election, as
"we have concluded that maritime operations of foreign flagships em-
ploying alien seamen are not in 'commerce' within the meaning of [the act] ."09
Thus it seems clear that even if the additional elements of the Honduran
union and the requirements of Honduran law had not been present in
McCulloch, the decision would have been the same.
Conclusion
This review of the cases dealing with the various phases of the applica-
tion of our laws to foreign vessels points up the following basic principles
which seem to underlie the treatment of the different situations:
1. Whenever there are overlapping or conflicting jurisdictions of two
independent sovereign nations, the question of the exercise of the
jurisdiction of either should be approached with an awareness of
the possibility of international repercussions if the jurisdiction is
not exercised wisely, with an eye to the practicalities of the contem-
106. - U.S. at -, 83 Sup. Ct. at 676 n.9.
107. - U.S. -, 83 Sup. Ct. 611 (1963).
108. The Supreme Court had held in San Diego Building Trades Council v.
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), that when an activity is "arguably" subject to the juris-
diction of the National Labor Relations Board the state courts as well as the federal
courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the Board, and must decline juris-
diction of the case.
109. - U.S. at -, 83 Sup. Ct. at 613.
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plated action and the possible hardship on private parties, and with
thoughtful consideration of how one would regard reciprocal treat-
ment by the other State. 1 0
2. The sovereign of the flag has jurisdiction over the ship with respect
to all matters on the high seas, and it continues to have jurisdiction
with respect to matters pertaining to the ship and its occupants when
within territorial waters and ports of another sovereign.
3. When a ship is in foreign territorial waters or ports, the territorial
sovereign may, if it wishes, assert its jurisdiction if the matter in
question disturbs the peace or tranquillity of the port, that is,
if it is of a character to affect those on shore or in the port when it
becomes known or if it is a matter which from its gravity would
awaken a public interest when it becomes known.
4. Unless a statute clearly shows that it was intended to apply to
foreign flag vessels while in our waters, it should not be construed
as so applying if to do so would directly affect the internal economy
of the ship; and without express and unequivocal language it should
under no circumstances be construed as making compliance by foreign
flag vessels a condition of entry here.
5. The foreign ship while within our territorial waters must obey
applicable laws which deal with matters external to the ship.
6. Specifically with regard to the Jones Act, "the weight given to the
ensign overbears most other connecting events." The act is, however,
applicable to a case of an American national (and probably an
American domiciliary) injured within our territorial jurisdiction on
a foreign ship; and lower courts have supported its application
to a foreign flag ship, wherever it might have been at the time of
the accident, if the control of the ship (and hence the responsibility
for any negligence), even though not the ownership, was American.
However, without such control mere American ownership of the ship
is not enough to support jurisdiction.
110. RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 40
(Proposed Official Draft 1962) states:
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law and
the rules they prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the part of a person,
each state is required by international law to consider, in good faith, the pos-
sible moderation of the exercise of its own enforcement jurisdiction, in the
light of such factors as:
(a) vital national interests of the states, respectively;
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement
actions would impose upon the person;
(c) the nationality of the person; and
(d) the extent to which the enforcement action of either state can reason-
ably be expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by
that state.
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7. The Norris-LaGuardia Act contains an unqualified prohibition
against courts issuing injunctions where the other terms of the
act are met; hence it applies to picketing of a foreign flag ship if
the case is otherwise within the terms of the act.
8. The Taft-Hartley Act is not to be applied to cases involving
foreign seamen on foreign flag ships.
While in time some refinement or modification of these principles may
occur, they should serve as reasonably firm guides, particularly since the
first five are time tested and carry the weight of tradition and precedent
extending well over a century, while the last three have very recently been
enunciated by the highest authority in the land.

